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Different directions in the implementation
Future work
Motivation
In the recent years, several cryptographic designs based on
quasigroups, are introduced:
stream cipher EDON-80 (Gligoroski et al. (eSTREAM 08)),
hash functions EDON-R (Gligoroski et al. (SHA-3 08)) and
NaSHA (Markovski and Mileva (SHA-3 08)),
digital signature algorithm MQQ-DSA (Gligoroski et al.
(ACAM 08)),
public key cryptosystem LQLP-s (for s ∈ {104, 128, 160})
(Markovski et al. (SCC 10)), etc.




Different directions in the implementation
Future work
Motivation
Little work is done for deployment of the quasigroups and
quasigroup string transformations in the field of the block
ciphers.
Carter et al. (SAC 95)
DESV - a version of DES in which XOR is replaced by an
arbitrary quasigroup operation defined by a Latin square.
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A quasigroup (Q, ∗) is a groupoid, i.e., a pair of nonempty set Q
and a binary operation ∗, such that for all a, b ∈ Q there exist
unique x , y ∈ Q satisfying the equalities a ∗ x = b and y ∗ a = b.
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Quasigroup string transformations
Given a finite quasigroup (Q, ∗), consider the set Q as an alphabet
with word set Q+ = {x1x2 . . . xt | xi ∈ Q, t ≥ 1}. For fixed letter
l ∈ Q (called a leader) the following transformations are defined:
Markovski et al. (LIRA 97)
el(x1 . . . xt) = (z1 . . . zt)⇔ zj =
{
l ∗ x1, j = 1
zj−1 ∗ xj , 2 ≤ j ≤ t (1)
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Quasigroup string transformations
Markovski et al. (LIRA 97)
dl(z1 . . . zt) = (x1 . . . xt)⇔ xj =
{
l ∗ z1, j = 1
zj−1 ∗ zj , 2 ≤ j ≤ t (2)
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Quasigroup string transformations
Markovski et al. (CONT 99)
e ′l (x1 . . . xt) = (z1 . . . zt)⇔ zj =
{
x1 ∗ l , j = 1
xj ∗ zj−1, 2 ≤ j ≤ t (3)
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Quasigroup string transformations
Markovski et al. (CONT 99)
d ′l (z1 . . . zt) = (x1 . . . xt)⇔ xj =
{
z1 ∗ l , j = 1
zj ∗ zj−1, 2 ≤ j ≤ t (4)
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Quasigroup string transformations
Mileva, Markovski (ICT 09)
Let Q be endowed with two orthogonal quasigroup operations ∗1
and ∗2. Then an orthogonal quasigroup string transformation
OT : Q+ → Q+ is defined by the following iterative procedure.
OT (x1) = x1,
OT (x1, x2) = (x1 ∗1 x2, x1 ∗2 x2),
and if
OT (x1, x2, . . . , xt−2, xt−1) =
(z1, z2, . . . , zt−1) is defined for
t > 2, then
OT (x1, x2, . . . , xt−1, xt) =
(z1, z2, . . . , zt−1 ∗1 xt , zt−1 ∗2 xt),
where xi ∈ Q.
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Different directions in the implementation
Future work
New design of the round function
The linear combining layer produce high diffusion of the input.
Quasigroup string transformations should be done with
different quasigroups that are obtained from the key, i.e.
keyed quasigroups.
If leader is needed, it should be produced from the key and
different for each quasigroup transformation.
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New design of the round function
Multiset attacks
(SQUARE attack - Knudsen (FSE 97), Saturation attack, Lucks
(FSE 01), form of structural cryptanalysis - Biryukov, Shamir (EC
01), Integral cryptanalysis - Knudsen, Wagner (FSE 02))
Constant multiset
Permutation or saturated multiset
Even multiset
Balanced multiset
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Multiset attack have been deployed on the block ciphers with
nonlinear layer, consisting of functions f : 2w → 2w applied in
parallel. Usually w is a small number, for example 8 (exception,
Lucks applied the attack in Twofish for w = 32).
First observation
Our nonlinear layer consists of functions f applied sequentially.
Naturally, one possibility in our case is w to be log2|Q|.
Second observation
Size of the saturated multiset is equal to the order of used
quasigroup.
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New design of the round function
Constant multiset C retains its special property after applying:
e-transformation with a fixed leader l , only if l ∗ c = l , c ∈ C.
If the quasigroup has a right unit and the right unit is the
constant value, constant string will remain constant.
e ′-transformation with a fixed leader l , only if c ∗ l = l , c ∈ C.
If the quasigroup has a left unit and the left unit is the
constant value, constant string will remain constant.
d and d ′-transformation with a fixed leader l , only if c = l ,
c ∈ C
OT -transformation, only if the two orthogonal quasigroups
have the same idempotent element and it is used as constant
value.
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Future work
New design of the round function
For e, e ′, d or d ′ transformation with a variable leader, if
quasigroup is without left nor right unit, we can not say anything
about constant multiset.
For OT transformation, if used orthogonal quasigroups are without
the same idempotent element, we can not say anything about
constant multiset.
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New design of the round function
Saturated multiset
For a fixed leader, saturated multiset retains saturated,
regardless the used quasigroup transformation.
For a variable leader, we can not say anything.
Saturated multiset retains saturated after OT transformation.
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New design of the round function
In general, for a fixed leader, for even multiset, we can not say
anything, regardless the used quasigroup transformation. The
same holds for OT transformation, too.
In general, for a fixed leader, for balanced non-saturated
multiset, we can not say anything, regardless the used
quasigroup transformation. The same holds for OT
transformation, too.
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New design of the round function
The sequenced processing of the string together with the
deployment of the keyed leaders and keyed quasigroups with
or without some properties, different for each quasigroup
transformation, give us protection against the multiset
attacks.
OT transformation should be mixed with other quasigroup
transformations, to avoid multiset attacks.
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Constructions with small quasigroups
One approach is to use a set of several fixed small quasigroups of
order 4, 8 or 16 and to use the key for choosing which quasigroup
will be applied on the current quasigroup string transformation
(similar to the design of Edon-80).
The set should be kept in the memory (order of the
set/occupied memory tradeoff).
Freedom in choosing quasigroups with desirable properties.
Quasigroups should be at least shapeless (Gligoroski et al.
(NIST 06)).
Expected to be very poor in the performances.




Different directions in the implementation
Future work
Constructions with huge quasigroups
Another approach is to use a computational method for producing
different quasigroups of huge order 216, 232, 264, etc.
Quasigroups are not kept in memory.
Ideally, chosen method should produce shapeless quasigroups
at least.
Depending on the chosen method, some structural properties
can be present in the quasigroups.
Expected to have much better performances, but they will
depend on the chosen method.




Different directions in the implementation
Future work
Constructions with huge quasigroups, first direction
Extended Feistel Networks (Markovski and Mileva (QRS 09))
Let (G ,+) be an Abelian group, let f : G → G be a mapping and
let a, b, c ∈ G are constants. FA,B,C : G 2 → G 2 is defined as
FA,B,C (l , r) = (r + A, l + B + f (r + C ))
When f is a bijection, FA,B,C is an orthomorphism. Algorithm
exists for producing FA,B,C of order 2
k2s from f of small order 2s
(for example, s = 8).
Quasigroup operation can be defined by Sade’s diagonal method
(CJM 57) as
X ∗FA,B,C Y = FA,B,C (X − Y ) + Y
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Constructions with huge quasigroups, first direction
Parameters A,B and C can be obtained from the key, so,
produced quasigroups will be keyed and different for every
transformation.
Only starting bijection is kept in the memory.
Depending on the chosen starting bijection and the group
operation, one can produce a shapeless quasigroup.
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Constructions with huge quasigroups, first direction
Every FA,B,C and its square F
2
A,B,C are orthogonal
orthomorphisms on the abelian group (G ,+). They can be
used for producing two orthogonal quasigroups needed for the
OT transformation, given by
X ∗FA,B,C Y = X +FA,B,C (Y ), X ∗F 2A,B,C Y = X +F
2
A,B,C (Y ).
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Constructions with huge quasigroups, second direction
(Rivest (FFTA 01))
Huge quasigroups can be defined by using bivariate polynomials
P(x , y) = a0 + a1x + . . . akx
k over the ring (Z2w ,+, ·), where
quasigroup (Z2w , ∗) is defined by x ∗ y = P(x , y).
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Constructions with huge quasigroups, second direction
The coefficients ai can be derived from the key, so, produced
quasigroups will be keyed and different for every
transformation.
There are no polynomials P1(x , y) and P2(x , y) modulo 2
w ,
w ≥ 1 that form a pair of orthogonal quasigroups (Rivest).
All parastrophic operations of a polynomial binary quasigroup
(Z2w , ∗), have polynomial representations over the ring
(Z2w ,+, ·). (Samardziska (MsC thesis 09)).
Algorithm for finding parastrophic quasigroup operation
(Samardziska (MsC thesis 09)).
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Constructions with huge quasigroups, third direction
(Samardziska et al (SCC 10))
Characterization of the T-functions that define quasigroups.
Only in special cases, time for calculating the quasigroup
operation and one its parastrophic quasigroup operation is the
same.
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Future work
Additional analysis of existing methods for computing the
huge quasigroup operations.
Deployment of suggested design for building particular block
cipher with software implementation, security and
performance analysis, etc.
Finding new faster computation of huge quasigroup
operations.
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